



Exploring the determinants of on-farm transitions: Evidence from rural China 
 




To shed light on the sustainable development of rural areas, we study the determinants of transitions from 
subsistence farming into either formal agricultural employment or agricultural entrepreneurship based on a 
recent nationally representative survey dataset. We pay particular attention to the roles of different capital 
endowments broadly including human, financial, natural, social and political capital. Our results show that, 
human, natural, social and political capital are all important determinants of rural households’ transitions to 
on-farm employment and entrepreneurship while financial capital plays a limited role. These findings are 
robust to fully controlling for off-farm transitions as part of the household occupational strategy. 
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Traditionally, mainstream development literature has seen the rural sector primarily as a source of cheap 
migrant labor facilitating incipient industrialization in urban areas (e.g., Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970), 
rather than being interesting in its own right. Similarly, policy makers prioritized the development of urban 
areas. This long existing uneven interplay between rural and urban development has the potential to undermine 
economic and political stability, especially for developing countries like China.  
Since the economic reforms initiated in 1978, China has undergone tremendous changes. Between 1978 
and 2014, it has grown on average by just under 10% per year (Lau, 2015). This has been achieved by 
improving the productivity of rural agriculture so as to release workers into manufacturing in urban areas. 
Despite industrialization during the early Maoist period (in particular during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-
62), 82% of the Chinese population remained in rural areas by 1978. Under Maoism, rural households were 
organized in people’s communes (RenMinGongShe人民公社) which shared both work responsibilities and 
fruits of their joint efforts. This resulted in poor incentives, low productivity and freeriding. In the early 1980s, 
the communes were disbanded and replaced by the Household Responsibility System (JiaTingZeRenZhi 家庭
责任制)1, which divided the commune’s resources (including land) and its output quota among the individual 
households. The households thus regained responsibility for their output, and were free to keep any surplus 
left after delivering their share of the quota (Lin, 1992).  
At the outset of reforms, in the early 1980s, the bulk of rural residents was therefore engaged in low-
productivity agriculture on land controlled by their household. After the relaxation of Hukou restrictions2, a 
migration from rural to urban areas started in the late 1980s, with rural migrants seeking better job 
opportunities alongside better education and medical services in urban centers. As with other emerging 
economies, there is an extensive body of research capturing this process in China, referred in the literature as 
off-farm (or non-farm) transitions (e.g., Zhang and Song, 2003; Shi et al., 2007; Li et al., 2016; Tian et al., 
2016; Wang et al., 2011; Lei et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016). However, in contrast to the attention given to the 
transformation of urban areas and rural to urban migration, there has been much less work on studying the on-
farm transitions, which can be defined as transfers of workers from low-productivity subsistence farming to 
                                                             
1 Household Responsibility System was first adopted in agriculture in 1979. In the traditional Maoist organization of the rural economy, 
farmers were given a quota by the government specifying the quantity of goods to produce. They received a reward for meeting the 
quota. Going beyond the quota rarely produced a further economic reward. 
2 ‘Hukou’ is a household registration system, which designates all individuals as either rural or urban residents. In the past, individuals 
were expected to remain in the area stated in their Hukou, and changing either one’s status (from rural to urban) or place of residence 




either formal agricultural employment or entrepreneurial activity in agriculture (as opposed to moving away 
from rural agriculture into manufacturing in the urban areas).  
In this paper, therefore, we study what drives the livelihood decisions of on-farm transitions in rural China. 
Our empirical strategy is based on a comprehensive rural household survey dataset covering 9 provinces from 
East, Central and West China. In doing so, we focus on households rather than individuals as the decision 
making in livelihood transitions is a profit maximizing and risk minimizing process of a household (Stark, 
1984, Taylor, 1987). In this sense, the allocation of household labor is a joint decision involving all family 
members as a whole. To preview the findings, we find that human, natural social and political capital are 
important determinants of rural households’ transitions to on-farm employment and entrepreneurship while 
financial capital plays a limited role. These findings are robust to fully controlling for off-farm transitions as 
part of the household occupational strategy.    
The contributions of our study are threefold. First, we shed light on the sustainable development of rural 
areas. Chinese government and President Xi proposed and adopted the “Rural Revitalization Strategy 
(XiangCunZhenXin乡村振兴)” in the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress in 2017, which aims 
to promote the sustainable development of rural sector. The ability of rural households to undertake on-farm 
transitions is of crucial importance to facilitate this strategy for primary reasons. On the one hand, on-farm 
transitions stimulate agricultural productivity (Haggblade et al., 2010; Levine, 2014; Zhan, 2017), which in 
turn both increases the wellbeing of those who stay in rural areas, and releases labor from agriculture which 
can then move to urban areas and help sustain economic growth there. On the other hand, on-farm transitions 
promote rural livelihood diversity, which in turn helps suppress rural poverty and promotes rural sustainability 
(Bebbeington, 1999; Ellis, 1998; Ellis, 2000; Haggblade et al., 2010). We observe rural households in 2015, 
some 35 years after the reforms were initiated. Although we do not observe when the transitions happen, given 
that the vast majority of rural households shared the same initial situation in the early 1980s, our analysis 
captures the outcomes of any on-farm transitions that had happened since then.  
Second, our study closely relates to the literature on agrarian changes. The diversity of rural livelihood 
strategies is central to the rural development (Bebbington, 1999; Scoones, 2009; Chambers, 2008). Such 
diversity, which is also beneficial to the households, is determined by various factors such as seasonality, risk, 
and credit markets (Ellis, 2000). Ellis’s framework has been followed by a small number of studies centering 
on the Chinese context. By observing different types of rural households, Zhang (2015) develops a 




development. Similarly, Yan and Chen (2015) posit that on-farm entrepreneurship is driven by the government 
as engine of rural development. Zhan (2017) also contends that these agrarian changes are driven by 
government subsidies as a form of capital accumulation. These studies focus more on the role of government 
policies but overlook the internal factors such as the households’ own capacity of driving agrarian changes. 
While the previous studies are mostly qualitative and case-study oriented, we add to the literature by providing 
a quantitative angle at the subject matter.  
Third, the literature has explicitly recognized that capital endowments are pivotal determinants of 
household livelihood strategy (e.g., Bebbington, 1999; Bhandari, 2013; Moyes et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2016; 
Tregear and Cooper, 2017; Inwood, 2017). Rural households often differ considerably in their resources, 
reflecting different local circumstances, past effort, resources inherited from their elders, and even luck. 
Therefore, unlike extant research attributing the agrarian changes mainly to financial capital accumulation in 
rural China (Zhan, 2017; Yan and Chen, 2015), we elaborate on this literature by examining to what extent 
other types of capital endowments can contribute to on-farm transitions, with capital defined broadly. In 
addition, we explicitly consider social and political capital. The Guanxi (networks and relationships) matters 
enormously in the Chinese society, especially in rural areas (Zhang et al., 2012; Jin et al., 2014). Similarly, 
rural cadres are responsible for key political and administrative decisions affecting rural residents’ off-farm 
employment (Zhang et al., 2003). Our study thus can show how different types of capital endowments 
contribute to the incidence of rural livelihood transitions.  
The remaining part of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and outlines the methodology. Section 4 presents the results and discusses the 
findings. Section 5 conducts a robustness check by taking off-farm transitions into account and section 6 
concludes. 
2.  Drivers of rural development in China  
The process of economic development of an emerging economy is usually understood in the context of the 
interplay between rural and urban sectors (Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970). Economic transformation 
is set off by industrialization in the urban sector, which becomes the source of economic growth. The rural 
sector instead serves as a pool of abundant labor, with the bulk of rural workforce initially languishing in low-
productivity subsistence agriculture. The plentiful supply of cheap rural labor supports the development of the 




there. This continuous influx of new workers keeps urban wage growth in check (in addition, if the urban 
wages are downward sticky, involuntary urban unemployment can arise as a consequence or rural to urban 
migration of labor). Eventually, the pool of labor in the rural sector becomes exhausted. When this happens, 
both rural and urban wages start growing rapidly: this phenomenon is referred to as the Lewis turning point. 
When the developing economy passes the turning point, the resulting urban wage growth constraints further 
expansion of manufacturing: to continue growing, productivity improvements become necessary.  
The jury is still out on the question whether China has already reached or even passed the Lewis turning 
point. On the one hand, Liu (2015) observes that both rural wages and agricultural productivity started to 
increase sharply around 2002-04. He therefore, argues that China reached the turning point around that time. 
On the other hand, Das and N’Diaye (2013) point out that the supply of low-wage labor in rural areas of China 
still remains large. They therefore anticipate China to arrive at the turning point only by 2020-2025.  
In line with the literature’s focus on the urban areas being where economic change takes place, the models 
of development are primarily concerned with off-farm transitions. However, Ranis (2004) argues that some 
countries experienced industrialization accompanied by concurrent dramatic improvements in agricultural 
productivity. He argues this was the case of England at the cusp of 18th century, Japan in the late 19th and early 
20th century, and Taiwan during the 1950s and 1960s. Such productivity improvements helped release further 
labor from agriculture while keeping the agricultural wage at or close to the subsistence level. Therefore, 
successful on-farm rural transitions can restrain the pressure on wages to increase and thus help facilitate 
further growth of urban manufacturing.  
At present, 41.5% of China's population live in the rural areas. The traditional sector’s share in the 
economy, however, is relatively low: agriculture accounts for 27.7% of total employment but only 7.92% of 
GDP (NBSC, 2017). The disparity between the sector’s contributions to employment and output are consistent 
with the observation that large stock of excess labor still remains in rural areas (Das and N’Diaye, 2013).  
With the liberalization of capital accumulation and the implementation of favorable agricultural policies, 
rural China is experiencing a transition from a tightly regulated peasant economy to a more open market 
economy (Long and Liu, 2016). As a result, on-farm entrepreneurship and on-farm employment are emerging 
as alternatives to subsistence farming on household-held plots (Yan and Chen, 2015; Zhang, 2015; Zhan, 2017). 
Accordingly, rural residents who do not move to urban areas have three options: remaining in low-productivity 
subsistence farming (that is, continuing to work on the family farm), leaving the family farm by taking up 




Wang et al., 2016). Which of these options they choose crucially depends on the resources at their disposal: 
savings and access to loans, skills and training, connections (both social and political), and the like. In other 
words, the occupational strategy depends crucially on the resource they possess. These resources often display 
the characteristics of capital stocks: they are costly to build (both in terms of monetary outlays and time and 
effort) and, if not regularly maintained, they tend to lose their value gradually over time. The endowments 
considered in this study include both tangible and intangible capital stocks: human; financial, natural, social, 
and political capital. Below, we briefly discuss the classification of capital endowments and what effects we 
expect them to have.  
Human capital can help facilitate on-farm transitions. It corresponds to the skills and knowledge (innate 
and acquired) embodied in labor (Tan, 2014; Bhandari, 2013; Inwood, 2017). As an important dimension of 
human capital, education plays a crucial role in decision making of rural households (Bhandari, 2013). For 
instance, Zhang et al. (2002) find that those who are more educated obtain more off-farm opportunities. 
Similarly, Wang et al. (2016) show that there is a strongly positive relationship between human capital 
investment and entrepreneurship as well as holding a managerial position. We expect education to have a 
similar impact on on-farm transitions: possessing formal education and having agricultural and/or 
entrepreneurial skills should help rural residents become agricultural entrepreneurs.  
With respect to gender, most studies (based on experimental evidence or observing investment behavior 
of men and women) tend to find that women are generally more risk averse (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; 
Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Sarin and Wieland, 2016). Becoming an owner of an agricultural business is 
associated with more uncertainty and risk than formal employment ( Ahn, 2010; Hvide and Panos, 2013). 
Therefore, we expect that rural households with higher share of women will prefer formal on-farm employment 
rather than a transition into on-farm entrepreneurship.  
Rural workers who migrated to urban areas in the past benefit from experience and skills that workers 
who never left the rural region lack. The migrant-worker experience can be helpful both with respect to finding 
formal on-farm employment as well as when it comes to setting up on-farm businesses. Thus, we expect 
household with former rural-to-urban migrants to be more likely to undertake either type of on-farm transition.  
Financial capital should also be significantly associated with on-farm transitions. Income, bank deposits, 
bonds and equity, and bank loans are essential determinants of firm growth (e.g., Fowowe, 2017; Lee and 
Stebunovs, 2016). In the context of rural China, where a large portion of households fall in the low-income 




agricultural businesses. Agricultural subsidies can be another financial resource for rural households. Therefore, 
we expect on-farm transitions to be positively affected by the household’s ability to benefit from government 
subsidies, especially so with respect to transitions into on-farm entrepreneurship. 
Importantly, natural capital has the potential to be the most important determinant of on-farm transitions 
(Kimhi and Bollman, 1999; Goetz and Debertin, 2001; Bhandari, 2013; Li et al., 2016). By investigating the 
extend of farmland fragmentation, for example, Su et al., (2014) conclude that the quality, quantity and the 
fragmentation of farmland have significant impacts on migration decisions. We anticipate the effect of quantity 
of farmland to be negative with respect to transition into employment: more land requires greater labor input 
from the household members. In contrast, households with more land should be in a better position to start an 
agricultural business (and hire labor external to the household to work on the land). Finally, the expected impact 
of farmland fragmentation is negative for both types of transitions: fragmented land requires more time and 
effort from the household members.  
Additionally, social capital can also play a role in on-farm transitions in the literature as it can facilitate 
transactions, reduce freeriding, influence goals and to expand access to better opportunities (e.g., Fidrmuc and 
Gërxhani, 2008; Bhandari, 2013; Moyes et al., 2015). As an important type of social capital in China, Guanxi 
represents the size of the network of relatives and acquaintances who can offer information and assistance in 
gathering resources and cementing business ties. Similarly, a common surname is considered as a sign of 
kinship with other bearers of the same name.3 We expect social capital to boost the propensity to undergo on-
farm transitions into both on-farm employment and entrepreneurship. 
Similarly, political capital can also be tightly linked to on-farm transitions. It is similar to Guanxi or can 
be treated as a special form of Guanxi in its potential to improve business ties and open doors to new 
opportunities. It refers to networks established on the basis of political rather than social connections, such as 
being related to or friends with government officials. Political capital can have a profound impact on rural 
residents’ labor market performance in the sense that helps them get have better information on occupational 
opportunities (Wang et al, 2016). Cadres, for example, hold most important political positions in China’s rural 
communities. When attempting to start an on-farm business, the access to market information is of crucial 
                                                             
3 Unlike most other countries, China has a relatively few unique surnames, with 100 most common surnames accounting for 84.7% of 
the population of the country (see 公安部统计："王"成中国第一大姓, 有 9288 万人 (Public Security Bureau Statistics: 'Wang' 
Found China's #1 Surname, Includes 92.88m People)." Available at: http://news.eastday.com/c/20070424/u1a2791347.html (accessed 
28-01-2018). The three most common surnames, Wang (王), Li (李), and Zhang (张) account for 7.3%, 7.2% and 6.8%, respectively, 
of the Chinese population (92.9mn, 92.1mn and 87.5mn in absolute numbers). However, there are important regional differences in the 




importance. The cadres can thus open door to success as entrepreneurs (Zhang et al., 2012). We therefore 
expect political capital to be particularly important in facilitating on-farm transitions into entrepreneurship.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our data is based on the survey entitled “Cultivation and Reform of Land and Relevant Factors in Rural China” 
carried out by South China Agriculture University in 2015. The survey was conducted in the following steps. 
First, 31 provinces (including municipalities and autonomous regions) were classified into 3 groups by a cluster 
analysis of population, per capita GDP, agricultural acreage, proportion of agricultural acreage, proportion of 
agricultural population and proportion of agricultural production. Second, 9 provinces were selected randomly 
across Eastern, Central and Western China, namely, Guangdong, Guizhou, Henan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Liaoning, 
Ningxia, Shanxi and Sichuan. These provinces are listed in Table 1 and their locations within China are shown 
and Fig. 1. Counties were then randomly chosen from each province again. Finally, 240 households were 
randomly chosen in each of the selected areas to participate in the survey.4 To ensure the quality of collected 
data, the final questionnaire was developed on the basis of a pilot survey. Survey was conducted through face-
to-face interviews and 2880 households participated in the survey. Eliminating invalid questionnaires (those 
with incomplete or inconsistent responses), the final sample contains 2704 rural households. Table A in the 
Appendix details more information on the cluster analysis for the survey.  
Table 1  
Surveyed provinces.  
Class Eastern China Central China Western China 
Class1 Beijing; Guangdong; Shandong; Tianjin; 
Shanghai 
Heilongjiang; Henan; Hainan Ningxia; Qinghai; Tibet 
Class2 Zhejiang; Jiangsu; Fujian Inner Mongolia; Jiangxi; Hebei; 
Anhui; Hubei; Hunan 
Chongqing; Sichuan; Yunnan 
Class3 Liaoning Shanxi; Jilin; Guangxi Shaanxi; Guizhou; Gansu; Xinjiang 
Sample Sizes 
 Guangdong Guizhou Henan Jiangsu Jiangxi Liaoning Ningxia Shanxi Sichuan 
Sample 600 240 240 240 600 240 240 240 240 
Valid N 547 239 230 239 587 221 226 201 214 
                                                             





Fig. 1. Location of surveyed provinces. 
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis, the household’s decision to undertake on-farm 
transition, takes four values, as given by the categorical choices shown in Table 2. No household members in 
formal on-farm employment or own an agribusiness is denoted with 0; one or more household members as on-
farm workers (and none as business owners) is option 1; one or more household members becoming 
entrepreneurs (and none in formal employment) is valued with 2; household members in both on-farm 
employment and others concurrently as agribusiness owners is denoted with 3.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive of dependent variable. 
On-farm transitions. N Proportion 
No household member as on-farm worker or agribusiness owner = 0 2147 79.40% 
Household members as on-farm worker = 1 409 15.13% 
Household members as agribusiness owner = 2 116 4.29% 
Household members as both on-farm worker and agribusiness owner = 3 32 1.18% 
The explanatory variables of interest, the capital endowments of the household are presented in Table 3. 
Note that the survey only collects information about the whole household, not about individual household 
members (with the exception of the household head).  
Human capital is measured by the number of economically active household members, their gender 




Households with more workers and more educated and trained members are believed to have higher human 
capital endowments (Schultz, 1961; Wang et al., 2016; Muchomba, 2017). Specifically, we set the length of 
compulsory education in China, nine years, as the threshold level of education, and distinguish between 
households whose average education level is 9 or less and those with greater values. As for training, the 
Chinese government has funded non-profit organizations to offer training programs, which the farmers can 
receive for free (Pan et al, 2017). We therefore include a measure whether members of the household have 
received such training. 
Financial capital is measured by household’s income, savings, access to bank credit, and agricultural 
subsidies. Specifically, we include the household’s total income, relative comparison of present income with 
the past and with other households, and having savings and/or bank loans.  
Natural capital is measured as the household’s contracted farmland, actual farmland used, land quality, 
and the relative size of land holdings. Farmland and land quality are indicators of the condition of the natural 
capital base. However, due to the limited farmland and the implementation of Household Responsibility 
System in the late 1970s and early 1980s that followed the principle of equality in farmland allocation 
(according to household size, the number of active members in a household, or both), farming operations in 
rural China are small and fragmented. Therefore, we use the farmland fragmentation as an additional measure 
of the condition of farmland.  
Social capital is measured by the number of relatives/friends that the household has and whether the 
family surname is popular in the village. In rural China, due to the small scale of villages and limited 
geographical mobility, people sharing the same surname may belong to the same extended family or a wider 
clan. They may be more willing to help each other as a result. For the same reason, the authorities in the village 
are more likely to be selected from among those with the most popular surnames.  
Political capital is measured as household members holding positions of village cadres, and membership 
of household members in the Communist Party of China (CPC). Both cadre status inside and outside the village 
is taken into accounts as on-farm transitions can take place both inside and outside the village. Being a CPC 





Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables and control variables.  
Variables N Proportion Variables N Proportion 
Human  
capital 
The number of active members of household 2704 100% Financial  
capital 
Household total income (yuan) Less than 30,000 = 0 1348 49.85% 
Gender distribution More female = 0 419 15.50 %  Between 30,000 to 50,000 =1 715 26.44% 
Equal = 1 1367 50.55 % More than 50,000 = 2 641 23.71% 
More male = 2 918 33.95 % Income compared with 2013 Lower = 0 372 13.76% 
Average education (of years) Less than 9 = 0 1922 71.08% Same = 1  1497 55.36% 
Greater than 10 =1 782 28.92% Higher = 2 835 30.88% 
Training of agricultural technology No = 0 2284 84.47% Income compared with others  Lower = 0 525 19.41% 
Yes = 1 420 15.53% Same = 1  1738 64.28% 
Entrepreneurial training No = 1 2424 89.64 % Higher = 2 441 16.31% 
Yes = 2 280 10.36 % 
Savings 
No = 0 653 24.15% 
Migrant experience No = 1 2284 84.47% Yes = 1 2051 75.85% 
Yes = 2 420 15.53% Bank loan Hard to access = 0  1702 62.94% 
Off-farm employment  No = 0 522 19.30% Easy to access = 1 1002 37.06% 
Yes = 1 2182 80.70% Agricultural subsidies  Low = 0 235 8.69% 
Off-farm entrepreneurial activity No = 0 2509 92.79% Average = 1 520 19.23% 
Yes = 1 195 7.21% High = 2 1949 72.08% 
Political  
capital 
Family members as village cadre No = 0 2039 75.41 % Social  
capital 
Popular surname in the village Unpopular = 0 554 20.49% 
Yes = 1 665 24.59 % Average = 1 797 29.47% 
Relatives/friends as village cadre No = 0 1636 60.50 % Popular = 2 1353 50.04% 
Yes = 1 1068 39.50 % Number of relatives/friends Few = 0 152 5.62% 
Family members as cadres outside village No = 0 2571 95.08 % Average = 1 1315 48.63% 
Yes = 1 133 4.92 % Many = 2 1237 45.75% 
Relatives/friends as cadres outside 
village 
No = 0 2125 78.59 % Natural  
capital 
Contracted farmland Less than average = 0 1475 54.55% 
Yes = 1 579 21.41 % Greater than average = 1 1229 45.45% 
Family members join the CPC No = 0 2216 81.95 % Actual Farmland Less than contracted = 0 907 33.54 % 
Yes = 1 488 18.05 % Equal to contracted = 1 1502 55.55 % 
Additional  
controls 
Age of the household head 2704 100% Greater than contracted = 2 295 10.91 % 
Gender of the household head Male = 0 1723 63.72% Land quality Poor = 0 328 12.13% 
Female =1  981 36.28% Average = 1 1285 47.52% 
Education of the household head (of 
years) 
≤9 = 0 1951 72.15% Good=2 1091 40.34% 
≥10 = 1 753 27.85% Land fragmentation Less than average=0 1494 55.25 % 
Household head’s migrant experience No = 0 1106 40.90% Greater than average=1 1210 44.75 % 
Yes = 1 1598 59.10% Productivity Poor = 0 746 27.59 % 
Traffic condition in the village Poor = 0 434 16.05 % Average = 1 1678 62.06 % 
Average = 1 1230 45.49 % Good = 2 280 10.36 % 
Good = 2 1040 38.46 %     




A number of additional control variables are included in the analysis. These mostly reflect the information 
available about the household head (the only member of the household whose details are reported in the survey). 
We therefore control the socio-economic characteristics of the household heads including their age, gender, 
educational level and migrant work experience. Furthermore, we also control traffic condition and distance to 
the center of township, which reflect the local conditions in the village.  
3.2 Methodology 
On-farm transitions are essentially a set of decisions on occupational choice with multiple options. We follow 
the studies on occupational choice and adopt the Multinomial Logit Model, which has been widely adopted in 
empirical analyses with categorical variables (Greene, 2007; Schmidt and Strauss, 1975; Barkley, 1990; Wang 
et al., 2016). The utility function for the household occupational choice is specified as follows.  
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝐺𝑋𝑖
′ + ɛ𝑖𝑗               (1) 
where 𝑈𝑖𝑗 is the utility of household i associated with choice j. 𝑋𝑖
′ is a vector of household characteristics 
and 𝐺 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The probability that option 𝑗 is chosen by 𝑖 can be written 
as follows.  






   𝑗 = 0, 1, 2 … 𝑁; 𝑖 =1, 2, 3…. 𝑀 (2) 
Note that we set decision j = 0 as denoting those household with no members as either on-farm workers or 
agribusiness owners as the base category; j = 1 if at least one household member is and on-farm worker (and 
none are agribusiness owners); j = 2 when at least one household member is a local agribusiness owner (and 
none are formally employed in agriculture); and j = 3 when at least one household member is an on-farm 
worker and at least one is an agribusiness owner. Note that only 32 households fall into the last category; 
therefore, we take the results for this group with a grain of salt and focus in our discussion on households for 
which j equals 1 or 2. 
The analysis proceeds in two steps. We first only include the capital endowments. Then, we also include 
the additional control variables (household head characteristics and local conditions) as well as province fixed 
effects, which can capture the effect of local-level factors that also affect rural on-farm transitions and whose 




government (and the extent to which implementation of national policies differs across regions), local-level 
institutions, and access to market. 
4. Results and discussions 
Table 4 reports the marginal effect of different types capital endowments obtained in a multinomial logit 
households’ on-farm transitions. Column 1 - 3 are estimated without additional controls and column 4 - 6 with 
additional control variables and province fixed effects.  
Table 4  
Determinants of on-farm transitions: multinomial logit, marginal effects. (N=2704) 
 










Panel A: Human capital       
The number of active members of household       












































































































Panel B: Financial capital       
Household total income (yuan)       


































































































Agricultural subsidies       
    Low -0.108 -0.042 -0.978 -0.824 -0.177 -1.604 
 (0.387) (0.407) (0.116) (0.472) (0.414) (1.862) 
    High -0.195 -0.326 0.342 -0.1943 -0.246 0.131 
 -0.108 -0.042 -0.978 -0.824 -0.177 -1.604 
Panel C: Natural capital       












Actual farmland       
































































Productivity       
























Panel D: Social capital       
Popular surname        

















































Panel E: Political capital       




























































Control variables       
Age of the household head 























Household head’s educational level 







Household head migrant experience  







Traffic condition in the village       
Poor 















Distance from home to town 







Province fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1)-(3) are benchmark models and (4)-(6) are with additional control variables; Standard errors are in parentheses; Significant 
level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
The results for human capital shown in Panel A suggest that having more active household members 
increases the probability of transitioning into on-farm employment. Note that we control for the amount of 
land that the household can use: holding the area of farmland constant, larger households are more likely to 
have surplus labor that can move into formal employment elsewhere. In contrast, the number of active 
members of household has no influence on the probability of undergoing transition into agribusiness. Training 




transition into both employment and entrepreneurship while agricultural training fosters only moving into on-
farm entrepreneurship. Migrant work experience of a household member has positive influence on transition 
into employment, while it has no impact on transition into entrepreneurship: former migrant workers probably 
have history of urban employment, and are likely to have acquired human capital that makes them more 
productive in rural employment as well. As expected, the number of household members employed off-farm 
has a negative effect on transitioning to on-farm worker status: with more household members working off-
farm, there are fewer members available to work on-farm. Off-farm employment does not, however, have 
significant influence on on-farm entrepreneurship. Having household members owning off-farm business has 
no significant effect on either type of on-farm transition. Finally, gender balance of the household and 
education of household members do not significantly contribute to either type of transition, contrary to our 
expectations. 
The effect of financial capital on on-farm transitions is reported in Panel B. The higher the income of 
a household, the more likely it is to transition into on-farm employment. This may reflect reverse causality: 
being employed outside the household brings in additional earnings, resulting in an overall increase in the 
household’s income. This interpretation is consistent also with the finding that household with employed 
members are less likely to report falling earnings compared with the previous year. Current income does not 
have a direct impact on on-farm entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, households with higher than average incomes 
are likely to have members who are agribusiness owners. Having savings makes formal employment less likely; 
contrary to our expectations, savings do not affect the transition into entrepreneurship. Bank loans have the 
opposite effect, being positively correlated with on-farm employment but not with being an agribusiness owner. 
The coefficient of bank loans on entrepreneurship is somewhat surprising: it suggests that agricultural business 
owners rely little on external finance, or find it difficult to obtain it, unlike those in formal employment who 
can borrow from banks against future earnings from employment. In addition, the level of agricultural subsidies 
does not have a significant effect, which can be explained by the limited extent of government subsidies (Park 
et al., 1998; Meng, 2012).  
In Panel C, we assess how natural capital contributes to on-farm transitions. Households with larger than 
average amount of farmland are more likely to transition into on-farm employment. Having access to more 
land than contracted, in turn, is associated with greater probability of entrepreneurship: this may be an effect 
of transitioning into entrepreneurial activity rather than a driver of it, as agribusiness owners may seek to 




than average productivity tend to have members transitioning into formal employment (after controlling for 
the amount of land). Land of better quality should be easier to work on, and this should help release some 
household members to seek employment elsewhere. Likewise, higher productivity of land means that less labor 
and other inputs are required to work on the given quantity of land, again helping release surplus labor into 
formal employment. 
Panel D reports the effect of social capital on on-farm transitions. The results display an inverted U-
shaped relationship between social capital and transitioning into formal employment. That is, both having a 
popular and unpopular surname is associated with lower probability of on-farm employment transition than 
having a surname of average popularity. Similarly, those with few and many friends are less likely to transition 
into on-farm employment than those with an intermediate number of friends. A popular surname probably 
means that many residents in the village share the same surname: this may result in weaker ties among those 
with that surname. In contrast, having an unpopular surname means that there are few kinsmen in the village. 
Interestingly, the effects of the two types of social capital on on-farm agribusiness transition are different: 
those with popular surnames are (weakly) more likely to move into rural entrepreneurship while having more 
than average number of friends has no effect on this type of transition. 
Panel E outlines the effect of political capital on on-farm transitions. The results show that having a family 
member as a village cadre has a positive effect on the probability of both types of on-farm transition. Such 
cadres could potentially help their family members through different channels. For instance, rural cadres can 
use their position to help family members gain better access to higher-level bureaucrats, potential business 
partners and employers, credit sources, market information or technical expertise (Oi, 1999; Zhang et al, 2012, 
Jin et al., 2014). Interestingly, the positive effect only appears when a household member is a village cadre: 
having more distant relatives or friends as village cadres, or having a family member as a cadre outside the 
village, have no significant influence on on-farm transition. This finding is consistent with Zhang and Li (2003) 
who also find that having family members as cadre has a significant effect on off-farm employment while the 
impact of having ties outside the village is insignificant. This is captured also in a Chinese proverb: “Distant 
water will not quench a fire nearby (YuanShuiJiuBuLeJinHuo 远水救不了近火). Hence, the depth of political 
capital is much more important than its width. It is also interesting that having household members in the 
Communist Party of China has a weakly negative effect on the likelihood of on-farm employment and no 




or that the Party membership helps them move out of agriculture into off-farm employment or career in the 
civil service while having no impact on livelihood improvements while remaining in agriculture.  
The results presented in column (4) -(6) when we control for additional variables and province fixed 
effects are well-aligned with the estimates in column (1) -(3). In particular, we find that the age of the 
household head has a positive effect on the decision to transition as on-farm worker (note that in this case, the 
age of household head is related to the probability of any household member transitioning into on-farm 
employment). We also note that poor traffic conditions in the village discourage on-farm transition into 
employment. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the gender and education level of the household head do not 
have a significant effect on either type of transition.  
To sum up, we reproduce our prior expectations and compare them with our findings in Table 5. Our 
expectations have been broadly confirmed with respect to human and natural capital, and also, though less 
firmly, for social and political capital. Rather surprisingly, the results of our analysis suggest that financial 
capital plays a limited role as a catalyst of rural on-farm transitions.  
Table 5  
Expected effects of capital endowments vs empirical results.  
Capital endowment On-farm employment On-farm entrepreneurship 
 Expectation Finding Expectation Finding 
Human capital     
  Education + 0 + 0 
  Training  + + + ++ 
  Share of females + 0  0 
  Former rural-to-urban migrants 0 + + 0 
Financial capital     
  Income 0 + + + 
  Savings 0  ++ 0 
  Bank loans 0 + ++ 0 
  Agricultural subsidies 0 0 + 0 
Natural capital     
  Quality of farmland + ++ ++ + 
  Quantity of farmland  ++ + + 
  Land fragmentation    0 
Social capital     
  Friends and relatives + +/ ++ 0 
  Popular surname + +/ ++ ++ 
Political capital     
  Household members cadres + ++ ++ ++ 
  Friends/relatives cadres + 0 ++ 0 
  Household CPC members  + 0 ++ 0 
Notes: ++ and stand for expected strongly positive/negative effect. + and  stands for (weakly) positive/negative effect. +/ stands 
for non-linear effect, and 0 stands for no effect.  
5. Robustness check: taking account of both on-farm and off-farm transitions  
The above analysis is focused on on-farm transitions and to what extent they are driven by capital endowments. 




This is referred to as off-farm transitions (e.g., Wang et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016). When 
household members move away to engage in off-farm transitions, the same person is no longer able to 
undertake on-farm transitions. Hence, on-farm transitions and off-farm transitions are both part of the 
households’ occupational choice set as substitutes. So far, we account for this by constructing explanatory 
variables that capture whether household members have undertaken off-farm transitions. An alternative 
treatment is to include both on-farm and off-farm transitions among the household choice set: that is, to include 
off-farm transitions in the construction of the dependent variable.  
Accounting fully for both on-farm and off-farm transitions yields 16 possible combinations as shown in 
Table 6. We designate undergoing neither off-farm transitions nor on-farm transitions (12.09% of households) 
as the base category. The most common outcomes are off-farm employment with no on-farm transitions 
(60.98%), off-farm employment with concurrent on-farm employment (9.06%), combination of off-farm 
employment and off-farm entrepreneurship with no on-farm transitions (5.70%), on-farm employment with no 
off-farm transitions (5.33%), and off-farm employment and on-farm entrepreneurship (3.51%). The remaining 
3.33% are households undertaking other combinations of on-farm and off-farm transitions. Each of these 
remaining combinations is too small to be analyzed separately, therefore, we aggregate then into an other 
category. We thus estimate multinomial logit of the probability of choosing one of the aforementioned 
combinations (marked in bold type in Table 6), relative to the probability of the base option of no transition 
(in bold and italics).  
Table 6 
Occupational choice matrix.  
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Table 7 reports the effect of capital endowments on combinations of off-farm and on-farm transitions. For 
the ease of comprehension, we denote the columns headings with combinations of letters indicating the 
presence of transition into employment (E) or into business (B), which can take place on-farm (in rural area, 




technology training in column (5) is positive and statistically significant, which means that receiving training 
in agricultural technology increase the probability of households undergoing on-farm entrepreneurial activity 
and off-farm employment. Entrepreneurial training lowers the probability of off-farm employment while it 
boosts on-farm transitions into both employment and agricultural entrepreneurship as shown in column (2) and 
(5). Column (1), (2) and (5) suggest that having migrant experience has an ambiguous effect: positive for on-
farm and off-farm employment but negative for on-farm entrepreneurial activity.  
The effect of financial capital is presented in Panel B. We observe that having household income between 
30K and 50K is negatively associated with transitioning into off-farm employment but has a positive impact 
on moving into on-farm employment as shown in column (1) and (4). Households reporting lower income 
level compared to the previous year is negatively related to on-farm employment while having higher income 
compared to other household is positively related to on-farm transitions (both as on-farm workers and 
agribusiness entrepreneurs). Having higher savings leads to lower probability of being both off-farm and on-
farm employed. Higher level of agricultural subsidies has a positive effect on the combinations with off-farm 
employment and on-farm transitions.  
Panel C reports the effect of natural capital. As expected, column (1) shows that having more contracted 
land and land of better quality reduce the probability of off-farm employment while column (4) and (5) show 
that higher productivity, quality and more contracted land boost on-farm transitions. The effect of social capital, 
shown in Panel D, suggests that having a popular surname and many friends both have a negative effect on 
on-farm employment, which broadly corroborates our previous finding. As for the effect of political capital, in 
Panel E, what matters the most is again having family members who hold the post of a local cadre. Households 
that benefit from a family member being a cadre tend to initiate on-farm transitions of both types.  
Table 7 
Determinants of combination of off-farm and on-farm transitions: multinomial logit, marginal effect. . 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UE UE & RE UE & UB RE UE & RB Others 
Panel A: Human capital       
 The number of active members of household 0.016** 0.013*** 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gender distribution        
Females ˃ males 0.046* -0.003 -0.011 -0.014 -0.002 -0.009 
(0.027) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
Females ˂ males 0.040** -0.001 -0.013 -0.015 0.007 -0.010 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Education level  -0.018 -0.003 0.016 -0.004 0.011 -0.008 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Training in agricultural technology 0.017 0.015 -0.039*** -0.029** 0.019** 0.017** 
(0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) 
Entrepreneurial training -0.105*** 0.037** 0.056*** 0.021 0.036*** 0.035*** 
(0.031) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) 
Migrant working experience  0.204*** 0.102*** 0.013 -0.028*** 0.003 -0.018*** 




Panel B: Financial capital       
 Household total income (yuan)       
30,000-50,000  -0.044** 0.007 0.013 0.022** -0.004 0.008 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
˃50,000 -0.030 0.011 0.006 0.031** -0.003 0.020** 
(0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Income level compared with 2013       
Lower 0.042 -0.039** 0.003 -0.023 0.004 0.024** 
(0.029) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) -0.010 
Higher 0.017 -0.001 0.008 -0.006 -0.015* 0.000 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Income level compared with others       
Lower -0.018 0.006 -0.014 0.009 -0.011 0.005 
(0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) -0.010 
Higher -0.029 -0.013 0.024** -0.007 0.025*** 0.010 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Savings 0.022 -0.029** 0.023* -0.015 0.003 0.006 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Bank loans -0.007 0.011 -0.016* 0.011 0.005 -0.013* 
(0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Agricultural subsidies       
    Low 0.812 0.724 0.821 0.608 0.605 1.228 
 (0.297) (0.331) (0.405) (0.317) (0.343) (0.748) 
    High 0.523*** 0.435*** 0.493** 0.608 0.394** 0.549 
 (0.130) (0.131) (0.162) (0.205) (0.143) (0.220) 
Panel C: Natural capital       
Contracted farmland -0.055*** 0.041*** -0.021* 0.004 0.003 -0.003 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Actual farmland       
   < Contracted 0.004 -0.015 0.027*** -0.009 0.010 0.009 
(0.021) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
   ˃ Contracted -0.060** 0.022 -0.009 -0.016 0.017* 0.032*** 
(0.030) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) 
Land quality       
Poor -0.013 -0.014 0.017 0.023* 0.003 -0.024 
(0.030) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
High -0.053*** 0.017 -0.001 0.021** 0.017** 0.006 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Land fragmentation -0.007 -0.028* 0.025** 0.001 0.009 0.007 
(0.024) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Productivity       
   Low -0.027 -0.012 0.019** 0.002 0.007 0.003 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
   High -0.025 0.005 -0.009 0.024* 0.009 0.019* 
(0.030) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
Panel D: Social capital       
Popular surname        
Unpopular  0.013 -0.025 0.002 -0.018 0.021** -0.014 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Popular 0.032 -0.005 0.007 -0.039*** 0.015 -0.015* 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
Number of relatives or friends       
Few 0.039 -0.038 0.018 -0.013 -0.028 0.006 
(0.042) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.017) 
Many 0.022 -0.044*** 0.017* 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Panel E: Political capital       
Family members as village cadres -0.066*** 0.030** -0.006 0.010 0.023*** 0.011 
(0.023) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
Relatives /friends as village cadre -0.029 0.016 0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.014* 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Family members as cadres outside the village 0.038 -0.001 0.006 -0.041 0.007 0.025** 
(0.042) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012) 
Relatives/friends as cadres outside the village -0.034 -0.010 0.016 0.014 0.010 0.006 
(0.023) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Family members join the CPC 0.030 -0.012 0.006 -0.012 -0.007 -0.001 
(0.025) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Control variables       
Age of the household head -0.007** 0.005** 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender 0.017 -0.010 0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 




(0.025) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Household head’s migrant experience -0.008 0.010 0.007 0.017* -0.002 0.005 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Traffic condition in the village       
Poor 0.050* -0.067*** 0.000 0.018 -0.002 -0.008 
(0.028) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Good -0.019 -0.005 0.020** 0.019* 0.010 0.006 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Distance from home to town -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.001** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Base = no on-farm and off-farm transitions; UE = off-farm (urban) employment with no on-farm transitions; UE & RE = off-
farm (urban) employment and on-farm (rural) employment; UB & UE = off-farm (urban) transitions (both) with no on-farm transitions; 
RE = on-farm (rural) employment with no off-farm transitions; UE & RB = off-farm (urban) employment with on-farm (rural) business; 
Others = the rest; Standard errors are in parentheses; Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
6. Conclusions 
China has long been attempting to shake off rural poverty and inequality. On-farm transitions, a pathway 
towards sustainable development of rural areas, therefore deserve greater attention. On the basis of a recent 
comprehensive survey of rural households, we investigate the effect of households’ capital endowments on 
rural transitions from subsistence farming into either formal on-farm employment or on-farm entrepreneurship.  
Contributing to the literature of rural development, our research confirms that capital endowments are 
important determinants of rural households’ livelihood strategies. Yet, the role of financial capital, such as 
savings and access to bank loans, is limited. Similarly, the government’s subsidies do not have a significant 
impact either. Instead, our results highlight the importance of natural, human, social and political capital. 
Specifically, investing in human capital, in the form of receiving training in either agricultural technology or 
entrepreneurial skills, increases the likelihood of transitioning into on-farm employment and entrepreneurship. 
Former migrant workers, who have returned to their home village, are more likely to find formal employment, 
suggesting that the experience of rural-to-urban migration improves their employability even in the rural labor 
market. Both the quality and quantity of farmland are important for on-farm transitions: having land of better 
quality helps release surplus labor into formal employment. Social capital has non-linear impact on on-farm 
employment, with intermediate values being more supportive of on-farm employment than either high or low 
values. Political capital such as having local rural cadres in the village also exerts positive influence on on-
farm transition. However, only local political connections matter, whereas political capital outside of the 
village is less influential. Finally, poor road infrastructure poses a barrier to transition into on-farm employment. 
A further and deeper analysis with full account of off-farm transitions largely supports these findings.  
The findings of our paper add credence to the argument put forward by Ranis (2004) that reaching the 
Lewis turning point can be postponed if the rural sector experiences productivity improvements in parallel 
with the growth of the urban sector. Accordingly, rising productivity in the rural areas helps release more labor 
from agriculture, which, in turn, helps keep rural wages low. Therefore, successful and on-going on-farm 
transitions can help maintain the high rate of economic growth in China in the years to come.  
Our research yields a few policy implications. Our findings help identify factors that facilitate on-farm 
transitions: acquisition of human capital, both in the shape of formal education and further practical training, 




rural areas, and improvements in the quality of road infrastructure. Policy makers should focus on these areas 
to encourage on-farm transitions and to facilitate sustainable development of rural areas.  
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Table A  
Descriptive statistics of 31 Provinces in China used in the cluster analysis.  















Beijing 2069 8.64 231.7 13.79 13.8 0.93 
Tianjin 1413 9.12 441.1 39.03 18.45 1.52 
Hebei 7288 3.65 6317.3 33.66 53.2 11.65 
Shanxi 3611 3.35 4055.8 25.95 48.74 7.00 
Inner Mongolia 2490 6.38 7147.2 6.04 42.26 7.38 
Liaoning 4389 5.66 4085.3 28.00 34.35 6.20 
Jilin 2750 4.34 5534.6 29.52 46.3 9.77 
Heilongjiang 3834 3.57 11830.1 26.01 43.1 16.91 
Shanghai 2380 8.48 244.0 38.72 10.7 0.85 
Jiangsu 7920 6.83 4763.8 46.43 37 5.49 
Zhejiang 5477 6.33 1920.9 18.83 36.8 3.55 
Anhui 5988 2.87 5730.2 41.02 53.5 10.85 
Fujian 3748 5.26 1330.1 10.97 40.4 6.41 
Jiangxi 4504 2.88 2827.1 16.93 52.49 7.75 
Shandong 9685 5.16 7515.3 48.86 47.57 7.92 
Henan 9406 3.15 7926.4 47.46 57.57 13.38 
Hubei 5779 3.85 4664.1 25.09 46.5 11.18 
Hunan 6639 3.34 3789.4 17.89 53.35 11.97 
Guangdong 10594 5.39 2830.7 15.73 32.6 3.91 
Guangxi 4682 2.78 4217.5 17.87 56.47 13.23 
Hainan 887 3.22 727.5 21.40 48.4 16.13 
Chongqing 2945 3.87 2235.9 27.17 43.02 7.38 
Sichuan 8076 2.96 5947.4 12.35 56.47 11.58 
Guizhou 3484 1.97 4485.3 25.48 63.59 12.62 
Yunnan 4659 2.21 6072.1 15.84 60.69 13.56 
Tibet 308 2.28 361.6 0.29 77.25 7.62 
Shaanxi 3753 3.85 4050.3 19.70 49.98 10.56 
Gansu 2578 2.19 4658.8 10.25 61.25 17.42 
Qinghai 573 3.30 542.7 0.75 52.56 6.18 
Ningxia 647 3.62 1107.1 16.67 49.33 10.27 
Xinjiang 2233 3.36 4124.6 2.48 56.02 22.32 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2013. 
